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LOCAL PESTICIDE REGULATION SINCE WISCONSIN 
PUBLIC INTERVENOR v. MORTIER 
Elena S. Rutrick* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are approximately 83,000 units of local government in this 
country.l On June 21, 1991, the United States Supreme Court unan-
imously held in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier that each 
of these units of government has the power, under the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),3 to regulate 
pesticides in its own jurisdiction. 4 The decision was important for 
two key reasons. 5 First, it allowed local governments to share in the 
protection of their environments. 6 Second, it made clear that states 
have the right to allocate to localities whatever roles the states wish 
within their schemes for pesticide regulation. 7 
In Mortier, the Supreme Court reversed the holdings of two lower 
courts8 by holding that FIFRA did not preempt local ordinances 
regarding pesticide regulation. 9 The Court explained that FIFRA, 
while a comprehensive regulatory act, left open to the states and 
• Articles Editor, 1992-1993, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Brief Amicus Curiae on behalf of National Pest Control Association, National Agricultural 
Chemicals Association, Agricultural Commodity Coalition, Edison Electric Institute, and 
Chemical Manufacturers Association at 2-3, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. 
Ct. 2476 (1991) (No. 89-1905). 
2 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991). 
37 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1988). 
4 Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, III S. Ct. at 2487. 
5 For further discussion of the results of the decision, see Tom Dawson, Local Regulation 
of Pesticides: The Victory and the Challenge Ahead, J. PESTICIDE REFORM, Fall 1991, at 33, 
33-34. 
6 See Mortier, III S. Ct. at 2486-87. 
7 [d. at 2483. 
8 The decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in this case is reported as Mortier v. Town 
of Casey, 452 N.W.2d 555 (1990). The Washburn County, Wisconsin Circuit Court case is 
reported as Mortier v. Town of Casey, No. 86-CV-134 (Wis. Cir. Ct. filed June 16, 1988). 
9 III S. Ct. at 2482. 
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localities the power to supplement federal pesticide regulation. lO 
Moreover, the Court reiterated its standard of "clear and manifest 
purpose" when inferring congressional intent in preemption casesll 
and, in a concurring opinion, questioned the value of congressional 
committee reports in determining congressional intent. 12 
The Mortier decision has set off a flurry of activity on federal and 
state levels. 13 The fight to stop local governments from enacting 
their own pesticide ordinances has now moved from the courts to 
the United States Congress and state legislatures. 14 Members of 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives have introduced 
bills amending FIFRA to include express preemptive language. 15 At 
the same time, environmental and states' rights groups are facing 
off against a coalition of pesticide industry and agricultural repre-
sentatives. 16 While the former are aiding local activists in drafting 
local pesticide ordinances or attempting to defeat preemptive state 
legislation, the latter are organizing advertising campaigns with 
national backing to halt any new local pesticide ordinances and to 
pass preemptive legislation at the state level. 17 
The pesticide manufacturers and users argue that local citizens 
and politicians are not capable of making informed decisions regard-
ing pesticide use. The agrichemical industry contends that only those 
with scientific resources and expertise should have the power to 
make these decisions. 18 Furthermore, the industry maintains that if 
the more than 83,000 local governments in this country were allowed 
10 Id. at 2482-87. 
11 Id. at 2483. 
12Id. at 2487-91 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 2484-85 n.4. 
13 See FIFRA Pre-emption Battle Waged in Wake of Supreme Court Decision, 15 Chern. 
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 764 (Sept. 13, 1991) [hereinafter FIFRA Pre-emption Battle]; 
Congressman Calls for FIFRA Change to Address Hi{Jh Court Pre-emption Ruling, 6 Toxics 
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 701 (Nov. 6, 1991); Industry-Supported Pre-emption Bill would 
Uphold States' Ri{Jhts to Regulate Use, 15 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1327 (Nov. 29, 
1991). 
14 See FIFRA Preemption Battle Expected to Shift to Congress, States in Wake of Supreme 
Court Decision, 15 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 500 (July 19, 1991); Congressman 
Tells Chemical Producers Pre-emption, Risk Will Top Debate on FIFRA, 15 Chern. Reg. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1600 (Feb. 7, 1992). 
15 H.R. 3850, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3742, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 2085, 
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
16 See, e.g., Pete Fehrenbach, A Not Supreme Verdict, PEST CONTROL, Sept. 1991, at 44, 
44-52; Terry McIver, Local Laws: What to Do, LANDSCAPE MANAGEMENT, Nov. 1991, at 8, 
8-12. 
17 See, e.g., Fehrenbach, at 44-52; McIver, at 8-12. 
18 See, e.g., Jasper Wornach, Local ReW'lation of Pesticide Use: The Federal-State Preemp-
tion Debate, CRS Report for Congress, Jan. 16, 1992. 
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to enact their own pesticide legislation, the cost to the industry 
would be prohibitive, and the intent of Congress to make FIFRA a 
comprehensive, standardized national plan would be frustrated. 19 
Supporters of Mortier have advanced both environmental and 
states' rights arguments. They insist that no one is in a better 
position to regulate pesticides than private citizens who are familiar 
with local climate, water, and population conditions. 20 They dispute 
the idea that scientific expertise is necessary in passing such simple 
legislation as posting notice requirements. 21 They point to omissions 
in FIFRA that need supplementation by local regulations as well as 
to the administrative backlog that is making federal and state pes-
ticide regulation increasingly ineffective. 22 Finally, they affirm the 
Supreme Court's holding in Mortier that states should decide for 
themselves what role to grant local governments in regulating pes-
ticide use. 23 
The battle lines are thus drawn and the stakes are high. Since the 
1960s, scientists have known that pesticides cause danger to both 
the environment and human health. 24 On the other hand, the pesti-
cide industry is a multibillion-dollar business. 25 It is no coincidence 
that a group of one hundred sixty farm, agribusiness, pest control, 
chemical manufacturing, and other interest groups, including the 
United States Chamber of Commerce, have joined in the effort to 
add preemption language to FIFRA.26 
This Comment argues in favor of local control of pesticide regu-
lation both because it makes environmental sense and because it 
comports with the constitutional rights of the states. Mindful of the 
arguments of the agri-pesticide industry that too many regulations 
will be too costly and will defeat the purpose of FIFRA, this Com-
ment urges states to adopt uniform regulations modeled on those 
19 [d. at CRS-3. 
20 [d. at CRS-2-3. 
21 FIFRA Amendments, Hearings on H.R. 3850, S. 2985, and H.R. 3742 Before the U.S. 
House of Representatives Agriculture Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, 
and Foreign Agriculture, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992) (statement of Thomas J. Dawson, 
Wisconsin Public Intervenor). 
22 [d. at 4--5. 
23 [d. at 2-3. 
24 See Martha McCabe, Pesticide Law Enforcement: A View From the States, 4 J. ENVT'L. 
L. & LITIG. 35, 35 n.l; Tybe A. Brett & Jane E.R. Potter, Risks to Human Health Associated 
with Exposure to Pesticides at the Time of Application and the Role of the Courts, 1 VILL. 
ENVT'L. L.J. 355, 368-80 (1990). 
25 The lawn care business alone produces annual revenues estimated at $1.5 billion. See 
Nancy Lloyd, Lethal Grass, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1991, at D5. 
26 See Fehrenbach, supra note 16, at 44--52. 
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that Wisconsin is proposing. These regulations, drafted with input 
from local governments, should quell industry opposition while at 
the same time allowing for consideration of local conditions. 
Section II of this Comment explains the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of preemption doctrine. Section III describes FIFRA as a 
three-level system of pesticide regulation envisioning federal, state, 
and local interaction. In Section IV, this Comment discusses the 
Supreme Court's Mortier decision. Section V recounts the action 
that has taken place since the decision, both on the federal level and 
within individual states. Section VI analyzes the arguments and 
current activities on both sides of the issue. This Comment concludes 
by predicting the outcome of this ongoing battle between the pesti-
cide industry and environmental and states' rights forces and offers 
a compromise solution that considers the need both for local input 
and for nationwide uniformity in pesticide regulation. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S STANDARDS FOR PREEMPTION 
The Constitution's framers debated the relative powers of the 
federal and the state governments.27 As a result, the Constitution 
delegates only limited powers to the federal government. The states 
retain the remaining powers.28 The powers reserved for the states 
were to be those that concerned the everyday affairs of citizens, that 
affected their lives, liberties, and prosperity.29 The powers assigned 
to the federal government were to involve mainly foreign affairs. 30 
The Supreme Court has considered the balance between state and 
federal power under both the Constitution's Commerce Clause and 
its Supremacy Clause. Under the Commerce Clause,31 the Court has 
permitted federal regulation of local activities as long as they had 
substantial national impact and were of the type that only the federal 
government could manage. 32 Under the Supremacy Clause,33 state 
laws that interfere with or are contrary to the laws of the federal 
government are invalid. 34 
27 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961). 
28 [d. 
29 [d. at 292-93. 
30 [d. at 293. 
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
32 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1, 36--37 (1937). 
33 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. . 
34 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.). 
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To decide whether a federal law preempts a state law, the Court 
examines congressional intent. 35 Courts analyze local ordinances for 
preemption in the same manner.36 When a statute's plain meaning is 
ambiguous, the Court considers the statute's legislative history to 
determine Congress's intent regarding preemption. The Supreme 
Court has been careful in assessing legislative reports and has in-
sisted that strong evidence or explicit language from the legislative 
history is necessary to determine the true meaning of the statute. 37 
There are three methods Congress may use to preempt state law. 38 
First, Congress may expressly preempt state law in the language of 
a federal statute. 39 Second, even without explicit statutory language, 
Congress's intent to supersede state law may be implicit either if 
the federal regulation is so pervasive that there is no room for the 
state to supplement it, or if the congressional act covers a field in 
which the federal interest is so dominant that state enforcement of 
laws on the same subject is precluded.40 Third, preemption may occur 
either when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal 
law,41 or when the state law becomes an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.42 
The Supreme Court has been hesitant to find implied preemption. 
Because Congress has the power expressly to preempt any state 
regulation, the Court places a heavy burden on plaintiffs trying to 
prove that Congress implied the federal preemption of a state or 
local law when it failed explicitly to preempt that law.43 Thus the 
Supreme Court has held that the federal government was not to 
supersede the historic police powers of the states unless that was 
the "clear and manifest" purpose of Congress.44 Particularly in the 
areas that states traditionally regulate, such as health, safety, and 
welfare, the Supreme Court has firmly insisted that plaintiffs dem-
onstrate Congress's clear and manifest intent to preempt before 
36 JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1, at 295 (3d ed. 1986). 
36 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975); Hillsborough County v. 
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). 
87 See In re Seidel, 752 F.2d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir. 1985). 
38 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 318 (1986). 
S9 See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
40 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 
v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190,203-
204 (1983). 
41 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963). 
42 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73-74 (1941). 
4S See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F. Supp. 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
471 U.S. 1140 (1985). 
44 Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. 
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striking down a local regulation. 45 In other words, the Court has 
required that there be an unambiguous congressional mandate to 
preempt state regulations. 46 
The rights of states are so strong that even when Congress ex-
plicitly states its intent to preempt state regulation in a particular 
field, the Supreme Court will not automatically strip a state of all 
authority to act in that area. 47 When an activity concerns especially 
deep-rooted local interests, there may be no preemption. 48 The Su-
preme Court has held that states will retain the power to handle 
matters of great local interest unless there is a "compelling congres-
sional direction" to desist from enforcing local law. 49 Thus, in Hills-
borough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.,50 the 
Court upheld a local statute that regulated blood plasma centers, 
despite the comprehensiveness of the federal regulations in the same 
field. 51 The Court presumed that state and local regulations related 
to matters of health and safety could coexist with federal regula-
tions. 52 The Court refused to infer, solely from the comprehensive-
ness of the federal regulation, a congressional intent to preempt the 
field. 53 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has rejected the idea that 
preemption should occur simply because there is a dominant federal 
interest in the area in question. The Court has reasoned that every 
subject about which Congress legislates is of national concern: a 
conclusion that cannot mean every federal statute preempts all re-
lated state law. 54 The Court has consistently maintained that the 
regulation of health and safety matters is primarily and historically 
an area of local concern. 55 
The Supreme Court has thus historically been mindful of the del-
icate balance between the states and the federal government. The 
Court has insisted on explicit language or evidence of clear and 
manifest intent before preempting local statutes. Furthermore, even 
when the language or intent of Congress was clear, the Supreme 
45 See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945). 
46 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 147. 
47 See Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 468 U.S. 491, 502 (1984). 
48 [d. at 502-03. 
49 See Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1977). 
50 471 U.S. 707. 
51 [d. at 717. 
52 [d. at 718. 
53 [d. at 717. 
54 [d. at 719. 
55 [d. 
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Court has refused to allow preemption in the areas of health or 
safety, traditionally matters of local concern. 
III. THE THREE-LEVEL SCHEME OF PESTICIDE REGULATION 
UNDER FIFRA 
In the United States, federal, state, and local governments share 
in pesticide regulation. This three-tiered approach comports with 
other environmental statutes and is known as "environmental fed-
eralism."56 The 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act,57 the 1986 
amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act,58 the Toxic Substances 
Control Act,59 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,60 and 
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,61 all provide a regulatory role for local 
governments. FIFRA comports with these other environmental 
statutes by also providing regulatory roles for all three levels of 
government. 
A. The Federal Government's Role in Pesticide Regulation 
FIFRA 62 regulates pesticides on the national level. Congress en-
acted FIFRA in 1947, primarily as a labeling statute aimed at elim-
inating unwarranted manufacturer claims and requiring warnings on 
product labels to prevent injury to pesticide users and harm to 
crops.63 Thus, while FIFRA originally protected product purchasers 
and users, it failed to protect the general popUlation from the adverse 
health or environmental effects of pesticides. 64 
In 1972, faced with the growing body of scientific evidence of harm 
from pesticides, Congress amended FIFRA.65 At that time, Con-
gress transferred the administration of FIFRA to the newly created 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 66 Under the 
56 See Brief of the Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. and the Sierra Club 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 
S. Ct. 2476 (1991) (No. 89-1905). 
57 33 U.S.C. § 1251. 
58 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339, 100 Stat. 642 (1986). 
59 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(l). 
60 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4). 
61 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718. 
62 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1988). 
63 CHRISTOPHER Bosso, PESTICIDES & POLITICS: THE LIFE CYCLE OF A PUBLIC ISSUE 53-
54 (1987). 
64 [d. at 58. 
65 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92--516, 86 Stat. 973 
(1972). 
66 Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2480 (1991). 
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FIFRA amendments, the EPA is to register and classify pesticides 
based on its review of the scientific evidence of their safety and 
impact on the health of individuals and the environment. 67 
FIFRA, however, has failed to provide adequate pesticide regu-
lation. 68 The 1972 FIFRA amendments require the EPA to review 
pesticides that are already on the market. 69 This review has not 
occurred. As late as 1986, the EPA had reregistered none of the 
50,000 pesticides that it was to reregister, and had completed review 
of none of the six hundred pre-1972 active pesticide ingredients. 70 
To help speed the process, Congress again amended FIFRA in 1988, 
but even under the new standards, it will be years until the EPA 
completes its statutorily assigned tasks. 71 
Along with registration and classification, labeling is another im-
portant aspect of pesticide control under FIFRA. To ensure national 
uniformity of label requirements, FIFRA expressly preempts states' 
labeling authority by explicitly providing that states shall not impose 
any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different 
from those delineated in FIFRA.72 
There are, however, many areas in which FIFRA does not regu-
late at all. For example, the statute does not require public notice 
of pesticide use or its hazards. 73 The Town of Casey ordinance that 
was the subject of Mortier requires that pesticide users give notice 
to neighbors and the public and mandates permit requirements to 
protect the local community and the environment. 74 Through a per-
mit system, the ordinance governs the time, place, and manner of 
actual pesticide application. 75 FIFRA has no permit system for the 
application of pesticides. 76 
B. State Governments' Role in Pesticide Regulation 
FIFRA mandates that states assume the role of the primary 
enforcers of pesticide use regulations, that they conduct inspections, 
67 Brief of Amici Curiae Village of Milford, Michigan, Mayfield Village, Ohio, and City of 
Boulder, Colorado at 6, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991) (No. 
89-1905). 
68 Id. at 7. 
69Id. 
7°Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73Id. 
74 Casey, WIS., Ordinance No. 85-1 (Sept. 10, 1985). 
75Id. at § 1-3. 
76 See 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1988). 
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and that they certify pesticide applicators.77 Additionally, FIFRA 
expressly authorizes states to set their own standards in regulating 
the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide in the state as 
long as the regulation is more stringent than FIFRA itself.78 As a 
result, almost all of the fifty states have enacted statutes regulating 
pesticides. 79 
Massachusetts and Wisconsin demonstrated the role of the states 
in pesticide regulation when they restricted the use of daminozide 
on apples after the EPA had determined that the chemical was a 
carcinogen but before the agency had restricted its use. 80 Similarly, 
about half of the states have attempted to bolster FIFRA by man-
dating notice requirements when users apply pesticides. 81 As of 1989, 
forty-nine states had enacted EPA-approved pesticide applicator 
certification programs, and forty-eight states had enforcement 
programs.82 The total cost of pesticide enforcement, certification, 
and training programs in the states was almost $30 million for 
1990.83 
States have allocated responsibility for pesticide regulation to local 
governments in several ways.84 Some states have encouraged local 
governments to share with them the responsibility of pesticide reg-
ulation. 85 Other states are express in their intention not to preempt 
local regulation. 86 Still other states do expressly preempt local gov-
ernments from participating in pesticide regulation. 87 
77 7 U.S.C. §§ 136f(b), 136g(a), 136i(a)(2), 136w-1. 
78 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a). 
79 For a list of state pesticide statutes, see Brief for the Professional Lawn Care Association 
of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9-10 n.5, Wisconsin Public 
Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991) (No. 89-1905). 
80 Brief of Amici Curiae Village of Milford, Michigan, Mayfield Village, Ohio, and City of 
Boulder, Colorado at 9, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991) (No. 
89-1905). 
81 [d. at 9. For a list of some states requiring notification, see Martha McCabe, Pesticide 
Law Enforcement: A View from the States, 4 J. ENV. L. & LITIG. 35, 48 n.50 (1989). 
82 Brief of Amici Curiae Village of Milford, supra note 80, at 10. 
83 [d. at 11-12. 
84 For a discussion of the role of states in pesticide regulation under FIFRA, see PATTI A. 
GOLDMAN, PUBLIC CITIZEN, LOCAL PESTICIDE AUTHORITY: IF IT ISN'T BROKEN, DON'T FIX 
IT, i, 3-4 (1992) [hereinafter GOLDMAN]. 
85 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 206.19(3) (local governments have role in establishing public 
notification rules, in scheduling pesticide applications, and in enforcement); LA. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 12.4 (1989) (local governments have role in establishing notice requirements for aerial 
spraying). 
86 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-10-112(3) (1990) (notice requirements); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 3:3225 (1989) (sale and application). 
87 See Pesticide Public Policy v. Wauconda, 622 F. Supp. 423, 431 (D.C. Ill. 1985). 
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c. Local Governments' Role in Pesticide Regulation 
The role of localities under FIFRA in regulating pesticides was 
the central issue of Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier. In that 
case, a land owner questioned the validity of a town ordinance that 
required a user to apply for a permit before applying pesticides to 
public or publicly used areas or before spraying pesticides aerially. 88 
Both the district court and the state supreme court held that the 
ordinance was preempted by FIFRA.89 The question arose because 
of the statute's ambiguous language and disputed legislative history. 
1. FIFRA's Plain Language 
FIFRA requires the EPA to cooperate with any appropriate 
agency of any state or political subdivision thereof in carrying out 
the statute's provisions. 90 It states that the EPA is to develop mon-
itoring plans in cooperation with other federal, state, or local agen-
cies. 91 Furthermore, FIFRA requires manufacturers to produce rec-
ords for inspection upon the request of any employees of either the 
EPA or any state or political subdivision that the EPA has desig-
nated. 92 Other sections of FIFRA, however, omit any mention of 
the role of localities and imply that it is the states alone that are to 
assume regulatory responsibilities along with the federal govern-
ment. 93 This ambiguous language was to lead to many court battles 
over the power of towns and cities to regulate pesticides. 94 
2. FIFRA's Legislative History 
FIFRA's legislative history indicates that the then members of 
Congress could not agree on whether to preempt local pesticide 
regulation. 95 In February 1971, President Richard M. Nixon sub-
mitted a legislative recommendation that was the basis for the 1972 
FIFRA amendments. 96 This recommendation became Section 19(c) 
of H.R. 4152, which originally provided that a state or a political 
88 111 s. Ct. 2476, 2481 (1991). 
89 [d. 
90 7 U.S.C. § 136t(b) (1988). 
91 7 U.S.C. § 136r(b) (1988). 
92 7 U.S.C. § 136f(b) (1988). 
93 See 7 U.S.C. § 136v, 136(a), 136u(a)(I). 
94 See infra notes 113-57 and accompanying text. 
90 See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2484 (1991). 
96 Brief for the Respondents at 20, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 
(1991) (No. 89-1905). 
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subdivision thereof could regulate pesticide sale or use within its 
jurisdiction as long as such regulation did not permit a use prohibited 
under FIFRA.97 The House Committee on Agriculture held seven-
teen public hearings on H.R. 4152 and similar bills and on September 
25, 1971, reported a new bill, H.R. 10729, out of committee. 98 That 
bill deleted any reference to political subdivisions in the section 
authorizing states to regulate the sale or use of pesticides. 99 The 
committee report explicitly stated that the committee had rejected 
the idea of allowing local governments to regulate pesticides, on the 
grounds that the fifty states and the federal government should be 
able to regulate. 100 
The Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry agreed with 
the House committee's reasoning. The Senate committee report ex-
plained that few, if any, local governments have the financial capacity 
to provide necessary expert regulation comparable to that which the 
state and federal governments are able to supply.101 The committee 
report explicitly stated that FIFRA is designed to deprive local 
authorities and political subdivisions of authority over pesticides and 
the regulation of pesticides. 102 
The Senate Commerce Committee, however, took the opposite 
position on the issue of preempting local pesticide regulation. That 
committee drafted its own version of the FIFRA amendments that 
authorized local governments to regulate the use of pesticides be-
yond the requirements that state and federal authorities imposed. 103 
The Commerce Committee reasoned that many local governments 
would be better able to perceive their own specific needs than would 
federal or state regulators. 104 
The two Senate committees studied the issue for nearly sixteen 
months,105 eventually producing a substitute bill that did not contain 
97 [d. 
98 [d. 
99 [d. 
100 H.R. REP. No. 511, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 16 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3993, 4066. The California Supreme Court interpreted this report as saying that FIFRA 
should not authorize local governments to regulate pesticides, not that local governments 
were prohibited from doing so. See People ex reI. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 683 
P.2d 1150, 1160 (Cal. 1984). 
101 S. REP. No. 838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993,4008. 
102 [d. 
103 S: REP. No. 970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 4111. 
104 [d. 
105 H.R. REP. No. 1540, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 
4923. 
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the provision authorizing local regulation of pesticides. 106 A majority 
of the Commerce Committee members and all of the Agricultural 
and Forestry Committee members agreed to this compromise. 107 The 
Senate then unanimously passed the substitute bill. 108 Senator James 
B. Allen, chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Research 
and General Legislation, inserted into the Congressional Record an 
excerpt from the Senate report which included the statement that 
FIFRA deprives local authorities and political subdivisions of any 
authority over the regulation of pesticides. 109 
When members of the Senate and House met in conference to 
resolve differences between the Senate and House versions of the 
bill, they failed to address the issue of local preemption because 
neither version of the bill mentioned local regulation. 110 The Senate 
agreed to the subsequent conference report without a recorded vote 
on October 5, 1972.111 The House passed the conference report on 
October 12, 1972, by a vote of 198 to 99. 112 Thus, apparently the 
legislators purposefully left the local preemption language ambigu-
ous. 
D. Lower Courts' Interpretation of FIFRA Preemption 
The lower courts' treatment of the preemption issue mirrored 
FIFRA's ambiguous legislative history. After Congress adopted the 
amendments to FIFRA in 1972, several local communities through-
out the United States enacted pesticide control ordinances. 113 The 
pesticide industry promptly took these localities to court,114 arguing 
that FIFRA preempted such ordinances. The industry plaintiffs 
achieved conflicting holdings. 
The county of Mendocino, California, passed an ordinance by ini-
tiative in 1977 prohibiting the aerial application of phenoxy herbi-
106 I d. at 4091. 
107 Id. 
108 118 CONGo REC. 32,263 (Sept. 26, 1972). 
109 Id. Senator Allen was probably cognizant of the importance of legislative history in 
interpreting ambiguous statutes. See Wisconsin Public Intervenor V. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 
2487-91 (Scalia, J. concurring). 
110 118 CONGo REC. 33921-22 (Sept. 26, 1972). 
111 Id. 
112Id. at 35543-46. 
118 For a discussion of some of these ordinances that divides them according to concern with 
record keeping, water supply protection, nuisance and proprietary, and notification, see GOLD-
MAN, supra note 84, at 5-10. 
114 See Dawson, supra note 5, at 33. 
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cides. 115 The county passed the ordinance after a forest products 
company sprayed herbicides that drifted nearly three miles and 
covered two school buses. 116 Wishing to protect its citrus industry, 
the State of California brought an action for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief against Mendocino County.117 The Mendocino County Su-
perior Court entered summary judgment for the state, but the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court reversed. 118 
In People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino,ll9 the 
Supreme Court of California applied standard preemption analysis, 
examining FIFRA's language, its legislative history, and the per-
vasive nature of its regulation. 120 The court found that there was no 
provision in FIFRA either prohibiting local governments from reg-
ulating the use of pesticides,121 expressly declaring that the term 
"State" excluded local governments, or providing that the state could 
not act through its local agencies. 122 In addition, the court found no 
implied congressional intent to preempt local regulation of pesticides 
in FIFRA's legislative history.123 Finally, the court reasoned that 
FIFRA was not too pervasive to be supplemented by local regula-
tion. 124 Thus, the Mendocino County ordinance stood. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reached a similar conclusion 
in Central Maine Power Co. v. Town of Lebanon. 125 In March 1983, 
the town of Lebanon, Maine, passed an ordinance that prohibited 
any commercial spraying of herbicides for nonagricultural uses with-
out approval by a vote at a town meeting. 126 In 1986, the Central 
Maine Power Company (CMP) asked Lebanon for permission to 
spray herbicides along its transmission lines to prevent interference 
and allow access for maintenance and repair.127 On August 26, 1986, 
the Lebanon Town Meeting voted down the permit. 128 
CMP brought an action in Superior Court claiming, among other 
things, that both state and federal laws regulating pesticides 
115 People ex reI. Deukmajian v. County of Mendocino, 683 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Cal. 1984). 
1I6Id. 
117 Id. at 1151--52. 
118Id. at 1152, 1157. 
119 683 P.2d 1150 (Cal. 1984). 
120 Id. at 1157-6l. 
121Id. at 1158. 
122 Id. 
123Id. at 1160. 
124 See id. 
125 571 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1990). 
126Id. at 1190-9l. 
127Id. at 119l. 
128 Id. 
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preempted the ordinance. 129 On June 19, 1988, the Superior Court 
entered summary judgment in favor of the town and determined 
that neither federal nor state laws preempted the Lebanon ordi-
nance. 130 
In affirming the lower court's ruling, the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Maine held that Congress did not intend FIFRA to preclude state 
regulation of pesticide use when such regulation is stricter than the 
minimum federal standards established by the federal act. 13l The 
court explained that the only explicit language in FIFRA that does 
preclude state regulation of pesticides relates to pesticide labeling 
and packaging. 132 Clearly, according to the court, the Lebanon or-
dinance involved pesticide use, not packaging and labeling. 133 
CMP argued that FIFRA's express grant of authority to the states 
to regulate pesticides and its lack of an explicit reference to local 
governments showed that Congress intended to exclude local gov-
ernment participation in the regulatory scheme. 134 The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine disagreed on three grounds. First, the court 
held that as a general principle, a state is free to delegate any of its 
powers to its political subdivisions. 135 Second, it held that under the 
Supremacy Clause, courts must analyze the constitutionality of local 
ordinances as they would analyze the constitutionality of statewide 
laws. 136 Third, the court explained that under the Supremacy Clause 
there exists a presumption that the federal government is not to 
preempt state or local regulation of health and safety matters.137 In 
other words, the court held that CMP's interpretation of FIFRA 
disregarded traditional notions of state sovereignty. 138 
The Federal District Court of Colorado held a consistent opinion 
regarding two Boulder 1987 and 1988 pesticide ordinances. 139 The 
Colorado Pesticide Applicators for Responsible Regulation (CO-
PARR), a nonprofit trade association of commercial pesticide appli-
cators, challenged the ordinances' validity.140 The first, Ordinance 
129 [d. 
130 [d. 
131 [d. at 1192. 
132 [d. 
133 [d. 
134 [d. 
135 [d. 
136 [d. 
137 [d. 
138 See id. 
139 See COPARR, Ltd. v. City of Boulder, 735 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D. Colo. 1989), aff'd, 942 
F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1991). 
140 683 P.2d at 364. 
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No. 5083, provided for local enforcement of FIFRA and Colorado 
laws complementary to FIFRA.141 The second, Ordinance No. 5129, 
required noncommercial users to notify the public prior to aerial 
pesticide spraying.142 
The court agreed with the analysis of the California Supreme 
Court in Deukmejian v. Mendocino. 143 According to the Colorado 
court, this approach was consistent with the ideas of state sover-
eignty and states' rights to delegate regulatory power in any way 
they deem fit. 144 The court found that Ordinance No. 5083 conflicted 
with FIFRA,145 but found no such problem with Ordinance No. 5129, 
stating that areas of legitimate local regulatory power do exist under 
FIFRA.146 
Two federal courts reached conclusions contrary to those of the 
California and Maine courts, and the Federal District Court of Col-
orado. In Maryland Pest Control Assn. v. Montgomery County, 
Maryland,147 the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland held that FIFRA preempted two Maryland counties' or-
dinances imposing pesticide posting and notice requirements. 148 Both 
in the language of FIFRA itself and in the statute's legislative 
history, the court found what it considered clear evidence that Con-
gress had intended to preclude the regulatory functions of local 
communities. 149 The court held that if Congress had wan.ted to in-
clude local governments in the regulation of pesticides, it would 
have. 150 
In January 1986, the Village of Milford, Michigan, enacted Ordi-
nance No. 197, which required all commercial pesticide users to pay 
a nominal registration fee, provide the fire department with a copy 
of their registration forms, and supply operators of commercial busi-
nesses or public buildings with decals that indicated the date pesti-
cides were applied. 151 In addition, the ordinance listed residents 
141 [d. at 367. 
142 [d. 
143 683 P.2d 1150 (1984); see COPARR, 735 F. Supp. at 366-67. 
144 See COPARR, 735 F. Supp. at 367. 
145 [d. 
146 [d. 
147 646 F. Supp. 109 (D. Md. 1986). 
148 [d. at 110. 
149 [d. at 111. 
150 [d. 
151 See Professional Lawn Care Ass'n. v. Village of Milford, 909 F.2d 929, 930 (6th Cir. 
1990). The ordinance mandated that the decals be posted at building entrances until the time 
of the next application or ninety days, whichever occurred first. [d. 
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"sensitive" to pesticides and required that all commercial users of 
pesticides notify each person on the list at least twenty-four hours 
before spraying. 152 The ordinance also required that outdoor pesti-
cide users place signs with specific language warning of the particular 
pesticide's hazards. l53 It assessed penalties for violators. 154 
While noting the conflicts among several courts, including the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit prohibited Milford from 
enforcing its ordinance. l55 The court based its decision on two 
grounds: that such local ordinances would obstruct FIFRA's goals 
because they would destroy the uniformity and comprehensiveness 
which Congress sought;156 and that the legislative history of the 1972 
FIFRA amendments suggested Congress did not intend local gov-
ernments to regulate pesticides. 157 
These conflicting court opinions provided the background for the 
case which the Supreme Court finally decided. 
IV. THE HISTORY OF WISCONSIN PUBLIC INTERVENOR V. 
MORTIER 
In 1983, Casey, Wisconsin, a rural town with a population of 404, 158 
sought the help of the Office of the Wisconsin Public Intervenor159 
in developing a local pesticide regulation.160 The town was concerned 
with protecting its twenty-six lakes and county forest land used for 
fishing, hunting, berry picking, and hiking.161 The regulation that 
the town board finally adopted, Ordinance 85-1, requires the acqui-
162 Id. 
163 Id. The signs had to contain the words "Chemically Treated Lawn-Keep Children and 
Pets Off for 72 Hours." I d. 
1Mld. 
160 See id. at 929, 934. 
156 Id. at 934. 
1671d. 
168 Brief for the Respondents at 4, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 
(1991) (No. 89-1905). 
169 The Wisconsin Public Intervenor is an assistant attorney general whose responsibility is 
to intervene and initiate actions in any court or agency for the protection of the Wisconsin 
environment. For a discussion of the office of Wisconsin Public Intervenor, see PHILIP L. 
DUBOIS & ARLEN C. CHRISTENSON, PUBLIC ADVOCACY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-
MAKING: THE WISCONSIN PUBLIC INTERVENOR, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY SERIES, Mono-
graph No. 26, University of California-Davis (1977); Arlen Christenson, The Public Intervenor: 
Another Look, Draft (Feb. 1985) (on file with author). 
160 Telephone interview with Thomas J. Dawson, Wisconsin Public Intervenor (Nov. 15, 
1991). 
161 Pesticide Rules Change: Supreme Court Gives Control to Locals, COUNTRY TODAY, June 
26, 1991, at AI, A2. 
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sition of a permit to apply pesticides to public lands or private lands 
subject to public use, or to conduct aerial pesticide spraying. 162 A 
permit applicant must submit to the town board specific information 
from which the board can determine whether to grant the permit;163 
the ordinance allows hearings. 164 In addition, the ordinance mandates 
the posting of warning signs after pesticide application. 165 
Less than two years after the board adopted the ordinance, a 
permit seeker challenged its validity. Ralph Mortier, a retired em-
ployee of the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, applied 
for a permit to spray herbicides both aerially and on the ground on 
his two hundred acres of forest land in Casey. 166 He wanted to control 
the nonforest vegetation on his land so that he could plant valuable 
coniferous trees to sell for lumber and Christmas trees. 167 In March 
1985, the town board granted only partial approval of Mortier's 
request. l68 The board restricted the lands on which he could ground 
spray and refused to grant a permit for any aerial spraying. 169 
Joined by the Wisconsin Forestry/Rights-of-Way/Turf Coalition, 170 
Mortier challenged the Ordinance in the Washburn County Circuit 
Court in June 1986, naming the town of Casey and its board members 
as defendants. l7l The Wisconsin Public Intervenor entered as a party 
defendant. 172 The Washburn County Circuit Court declared the or-
dinance void on the grounds that both FIFRA and state law 
preempted it.173 On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld 
the circuit court's order on the federal preemption question. 174 
On June 5, 1990, the Wisconsin Public Intervenor petitioned the 
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 175 He argued 
that FIFRA did not preempt local governments from enacting their 
own pesticide regulations, and that under the Tenth Amendment, 
162 Casey, Wis. Ordinance No. 85-1 § 1.2 (Sept. 10, 1985). 
163 Id. at § 1.3(2). 
164 Id. at § 1.3(4) & (5). 
165 Id. at § 1.3(7). 
166 Brief for the Respondents at 6, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 
(1991) (No. 89-1905). 
167 See Town Wins Supreme Court Pesticide Case, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, June 22, 1991, 
at 4A. 
168 Brief for the Respondents at 6, Mortier (89-1905). 
169Id. 
17°Id. 
171 Brief of Petitioners at 7, Mortier (No. 89-1905). 
172 Brief of Petitioners at 7-8, Mortier (No. 89-1905). 
173 Mortier v. Town of Casey, No. 86-CV-134 (Wis. Cir. Ct. filed June 16, 1988) at 5, 9. 
174 Mortier v. Town of Casey, 452 N.W.2d 555, 555n.2 (Wis. 1990). 
175 Brief of Petitioners at 10, Mortier (No. 89-1905). 
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states had the right to allocate regulatory power to any of their local 
agencies. 176 The United States Supreme Court in turn invited the 
United States Solicitor General to file a brief stating the views of 
the United States on the petition. 177 In his brief, the Solicitor General 
recommended that the Court grant certiorari and reverse the find-
ings of the lower court.178 In January 1991, the Court granted the 
writ of certiorari. 179 
On June 21, 1991, the Supreme Court unanimously decided in 
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier that FIFRA did not preempt 
local regulation of pesticides. l80 The Court was unable to infer from 
either FIFRA's statutory language or its legislative history that 
Congress intended federal pesticide regulation to preempt local reg-
ulation. 181 Despite the fact that both sides submitted briefs on the 
subject,l82 the Court declined to address FIFRA's policy and instead 
concentrated on the statute's language and legislative history. 183 
In Mortier, the Court explained that preemption could occur in 
several ways: when a federal statute expressly preempts state law;l84 
when the statute so pervasively occupies the field that state supple-
mental action is precluded;l85 when state and federal laws conflict;l86 
and when state laws stand as an obstacle to the fulfillment of federal 
goals. 187 The Court considered and rejected each of these possibili-
176 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin at 2~7, 
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct 2476 (1991) (No. 89-1905). 
177 Brief of Petitioners at 11, Mortier (No. 89-1905). 
178Id. at 11. 
179 I d. at 12. 
180 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2482 (1991). 
181Id. 
182 See Briefs Amicus Curiae on behalf of National Pest Control Association, National 
Agricultural Chemicals Association, Agricultural Commodity Coalition, Edison Electric In-
stitute, and Chemical Manufacturers Association; Green Industry Council; Professional Lawn 
Care Association of America; American Association of Nurserymen, American Pulpwood 
Association, Associated Landscape Contractors of America, Chemical Producers and Distrib-
utors Association, Industrial Biotechnology Association, International Apple Institute, Inter-
national Sanitary Supply Association, Midwest Food Processors Association, National Agri-
cultural Aviation Association, National Arborist Association, National Fertilizer Solutions 
Association, National Forest Products Association, Roses, Inc., and Society of American 
Florists; Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. and the Sierra Club; Brief of 
Village of Milford, Michigan, Mayfield Village, Ohio, and the City of Boulder, Colorado, 
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991) (No. 89-1905). 
IB3 Lawrence S. Ebner, FIFRA Pre-emption Battle Expected to Shift to Congress, States 
in Wake of Supreme Court Decision, 15 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 500 (July 19, 
1991). 
184 Mortier, 111 S. Ct. at 2481. 
186Id. 
186 Id. at 2482. 
187 Id.; see supra notes 35-55 and accompanying text. 
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ties. l88 The Court then considered FIFRA's statutory language and 
declared that it could not find that Congress had indicated a "clear 
and manifest purpose" to preempt local regulation. 189 
Not finding congressional intent to preempt in the language of 
FIFRA, the Court carefully reviewed the statute's legislative his-
tory and concluded that the evidence of legislative intent to preempt 
local regulation was ambiguous at best. l90 The Court began its anal-
ysis by considering the committee report of the House Agricultural 
Committee. 191 According to the Court, the report clearly stated that 
the House Agricultural Committee had rejected a proposal to permit 
political subdivisions to regulate pesticides, reasoning that the fifty 
states along with the EPA provided a sufficient number of regulatory 
jurisdictions. 192 The Court found, however, that while the committee 
report did refuse to grant local governments direct regulatory au-
thority, it did not indicate Congress's intent to prevent states from 
delegating such authority to their political subdivisions. 193 
The Court further found that the two principal committees re-
sponsible for the FIFRA amendments bill disagreed over whether 
FIFRA preempted local regulation of pesticides. 194 Noting that the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry report explicitly 
stated its agreement with the House Agricultural Committee,195 the 
Court also pointed out that the Senate Commerce Committee had 
proposed an amendment expressly authorizing local regulation. 196 
Thus, the Court held that FIFRA's legislative history, like its lan-
guage, did not indicate that Congress's "clear and manifest purpose" 
was to preempt local pesticide regulation. 197 
The Supreme Court then explained that while it could not find 
preemption through its reading of FIFRA's text or legislative his-
tory, it also could not find preemption through field preemption. 198 
The Court concluded that FIFRA was not so comprehensive as to 
leave no room for states and localities to supplement it.l99 On the 
188 Mortier, 111 S. Ct. at 2482. 
189 [d. at 2483. 
190 [d. at 2484. 
191 [d. 
192 [d. 
193 [d. 
194 Mortier, 111 S. Ct. at 2484. 
195 [d. 
196 [d. 
197 [d. 
198 [d. at 2486. 
199 Mortier, 111 S. Ct. at 2486. 
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contrary, the Court noted that FIFRA does not address many areas 
of regulation, including permit schemes and the consideration of 
factors such as climate, population, geography, and water supply. 200 
Additionally, the Court found no conflict between FIFRA and either 
the town of Casey's Ordinance 85-1 or local regulation in generaJ.201 
It stated that compliance with both Ordinance 85-1 and FIFRA was 
not an impossibility. 202 
The 9-to-0 decision finding neither express, implied, field, nor 
conflict preemption seemed to settle the matter of pesticide regula-
tion by local government once and for all. Such was not, however, 
to be the case. 
V. EVENTS SINCE MORTIER 
Within eleven days of the Supreme Court's decision in M artier, 
several pesticide associations organized a "summit meeting" of na-
tional trade associations. Ninety-two people from more than sixty 
associations attended. 203 The participants considered M artier to be 
the most devastating news ever to hit their industry.204 To counter 
the feared effect of the Supreme Court's decision, they formed a 
steering committee205 that developed a three-pronged strategy to 
combat local pesticide regulation on the federal, state, and local 
levels simultaneously.206 By the end of July, at the time of its next 
general meeting, the committee had assumed the name of the Co-
alition for Sensible Pesticide Policy (CSPP).207 By November 1991, 
CSPP's membership had grown to include one hundred thirty asso-
ciations and businesses, including pest control companies, nurseries, 
florists, arborists, landscape and lawn care companies, chemical man-
ufacturers,208 and the United States Chamber of Commerce. 209 
CSPP's objective was to obtain uniform federal-state pesticide reg-
200 Id. 
201Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Fehrenbach, supra note 16, at 47-48. 
2001 Id. at 44. 
206 Id. at 48. The steering committee consisted of the National Pest Control Association, 
the National Agricultural Chemicals Association, the Chemical Specialty Manufacturers As-
sociation, the Agricultural Commodities Coalition, and the Professional Lawn Care Association 
of America. Id. at 44-48. 
206 I d. at 48. 
'IIYI Id. 
208 Memorandum from The Coalition for Sensible Pesticide Policy (Sept. 16, 1991) (on file 
with author). 
209 Fehrenbach, supra note 16, at 48. 
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ulation by passing preemptive legislation while still encouraging local 
input at the state level. 210 
CSPP moved fast. By early September 1991, CSPP had drafted a 
proposed amendment to FIFRA that expressly denied local govern-
ments regulatory power over pesticides. 211 To garner further support 
for its bill, the coalition sent letters to members of President George 
Bush's administration. 212 At the end of November 1991, Represen-
tatives Charles Hatcher, a Democrat from Georgia, and Ron Mar-
lenee, a RepUblican from Montana, and thirty of the forty-five mem-
bers of the House Committee on Agriculture213 introduced the CSPP-
sponsored legislation in the House of Representatives214 while Sen-
ator David Pryor, a Democrat from Arkansas, introduced companion 
legislation in the Senate. 215 
The Hatcher-Marlenee technical amendment to FIFRA, known as 
the "Federal-State Pesticide Regulation Partnership Act of 1991," 
purported to clarify FIFRA's past ambiguities regarding federal 
preemption of local pesticide regulation.216 The amendment defined 
the term "State" in FIFRA to exclude local governments. 217 It also 
included a paragraph expressly stating that local governments are 
to play no role in regulating pesticides. 218 The Hatcher-Marlenee 
amendment was an attempt to replace a provision in a bill introduced 
by Representative Charles Rose, Democrat from North Carolina, 
chairman of the House Agricultural Subcommittee on Department 
Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture. Representative 
Rose's bill is the reauthorization vehicle for FIFRA, whose author-
ization expires at the end of fiscal 1992.219 The Rose bill originally 
left preemption up to each state. 220 On May 19, 1992, the House 
Agricultural Subcommittee adopted the Hatcher-Marlenee language 
210 Memorandum, supra note 208, at 1. 
211 See FIFRA Pre-emption Battle, supra note 13, at 764. 
212Id. CSPP sent letters to the President; Vice President; Secretaries of Agriculture, 
Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development; Depart-
ments of the Interior, Labor, State, and Transportation; Administrator of the EPA; and 
United States Trade Representative. Id. 
213 See Industry-Supported, supra note 13, at 1327. 
214 H.R. 3850, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
215 S. 2085, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
216 See H.R. 3850, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
217Id. 
218Id. 
219 Congressman Tells Chemical Producers Pre-Emption, Risk will Top Debate on FIFRA, 
15 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1600 (Feb. 7, 1992). 
220 See H.R. 3742, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
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into Representative Rose's FIFRA reauthorization bill.221 As it is 
now written, the bill would preempt local government regulation of 
pesticides. 222 
In their floor statements introducing their bill, Representatives 
Hatcher223 and Marlenee224 reviewed the history of Wisconsin Public 
Intervenor v. Mortier. Representative Hatcher based his support for 
the proposed amendment to FIFRA on three major policy argu-
ments. First, he maintained that pesticide regulation is complex and 
must be based on scientific judgment not available in local jurisdic-
tions. 225 Second, he argued that local regulations would quickly en-
cumber agricultural production. 226 Third, Representative Hatcher 
insisted that too much regulation of pesticides might actually damage 
the health and welfare of the public because pesticides provide ben-
efits to human health such as mosquito control. 227 
Representative Marlenee argued similar policy positions on the 
House floor. Raising the specter of 83,000 different pesticide regu-
lations, Representative Marlenee suggested that the economic bur-
den on pest control and lawn care companies would be enormous. 228 
In addition, he pointed out that local regulations would bring about 
a state of regulatory chaos that would undermine the goals of FI-
FRA.229 Finally, Representative Marlenee maintained that states 
had to avoid local input because pesticide regulation required tech-
nical and scientific expertise.230 Senator Pryor echoed these general 
arguments in his floor statements. 231 He opposed local regulation of 
pesticides on the grounds that localities did not have the necessary 
scientific resources, that local regulations would amount to regula-
tory confusion, and that local regulations would produce an enormous 
economic burden on farmers and the pesticide industry. 232 
As a hedge against the possibility that Congress will not pass the 
Rose bill, or that it will take several years to do so, CSPP has 
221 Amy Porter, One Year After Local Pesticide Use Controls Upheld, Debate Continues in 
State Legislatures, City Halls, Congress, 16 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 687 (July 3, 
1992). 
222 [d. 
223 137 CONGo REC. E3983 (daily ed. Nov. 22,1991) (extension of remarks by Rep. Hatcher). 
224 137 CONGo REc. E3987 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1991) (extension of remarks by Rep. Marlenee). 
225 137 CONGo REc. at E3983. 
226 [d. 
227 [d. at E3984. 
228 [d. at E3987. 
229 [d. 
230 [d. 
231 137 CONGo REc. S18401 (dailyed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pryor). 
232 [d. 
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instituted an interim strategy of organizing at the state level. 233 Prior 
to Mortier, the courts in several states already had held that their 
state pesticide legislation implied preemption of local ordinances. 234 
After the decision, CSPP moved to try to get express preemptive 
language placed in other states' statutes. The group drafted a model 
amendment. 235 The first such push occurred in the state of Washing-
ton and was apparently unsuccessful. 236 As of June 1992, thirteen of 
the twenty-seven states addressing the issue had enacted preemp-
tion legislation, eight had defeated such legislation, and action in six 
states was still pending. 237 
The third tier of CSPP's campaign to halt local pesticide regulation 
is taking place at the local level. As soon as the Supreme Court 
decided Mortier, CSPP escalated industry efforts to monitor and to 
defeat any local ordinances being considered throughout the coun-
try.238 Typical of those efforts was what transpired in Missoula, 
Montana. 
233 See Fehrenbach, supra note 16, at 52. 
234 See Pesticide Public Policy Foundation v. Village of Wauconda, Illinois, 622 F. Supp. 
423, 432 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Town of Wendell v. Attorney General, 476 N.E. 2d 585, 592 (Mass. 
1985); Ames v. Smoot, 471 N.Y.S. 2d 128, 133 (1983); Town of Salisbury v. New England 
Power Co., 437 A. 2d 281, 281 (N.H. 1981). 
235 Porter, supra note 221, at 687. The model state preemption language calls for prohibiting 
any city, town, county, or other political subdivision from adopting or maintaining existing 
rules regarding the sale or use of pesticides. Id. 
236 See John Dodge, Pesticide-Use Bill Dies in House Committee, THE OLYMPIAN, Feb. 4, 
1992; John Trombold, State Lawmakers Debate Rule for Pesticide Use, THE PENINSULA 
GATEWAY, Jan. 29, 1992. 
237 Porter, supra note 221, at 687; Telephone interview with Christina Roessler, Develop-
ment Director, NCAMP, Feb. 14, 1992. In New Mexico, the state Farm and Livestock Bureau 
and the Department of Agriculture have been meeting to draft legislation barring local 
governments from passing their own pesticide laws. See Kent Paterson, Environmental 
Urgency for '90s, THE SUN, Feb. 1992, at 9. 
In the state of Washington, the House defeated legislation, H.B. 2531, that would have 
banned cities and counties from having stricter pesticide use regulations than the state 
regulations. See John Dodge, supra note 236, at 32. This followed contamination of wells in 
Thurston County, blamed on the legal use of farm chemicals. Id. 
In Michigan, Senate Bill 643 is aimed at amending the state Pesticide Control Act to prevent 
local ordinances that conflict with or duplicate state law. See Barbara McClellan, State May 
Weaken Local Pesticide Laws, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 4, 1992. Currently, there are about a 
half-dozen Michigan communities with pesticide laws. Id. 
In Kansas, Senate Bill 543 would preempt local pesticide ordinances. See Memorandum 
from Jim Kaup, Gen. Counsel, League of Kansas Municipalities, to Chairman Doyen and 
Members, Sen. Com. on Energy and Natural Resources (Apr. 7, 1991) (on file with author). 
238 See generally McIver, supra note 16, at 8-12. Members were asked to be on the alert 
for information about any local pesticide ordinances and to fax any information they received 
to the affected parties. CSPP has offered its members answers and arguments to use when 
attempting to defeat local pesticide regulations. Id. 
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In the fall of 1991, Missoula, Montana, proposed the first local 
ordinance to go to a public vote since the Mortier decision. 239 The 
Missoula Pesticide Right-to-Know ordinance would have required 
property owners to post warning signs twenty-four hours before 
pesticide application; the signs were to remain up for forty-eight 
hours after the application.240 Missoula drafted the ordinance because 
it relied completely on its EPA-designated sole source aquifer for its 
drinking water supply, and a portion of the aquifer had already 
become contaminated with pesticides. 241 A group calling itself the 
"Missoula Homeowners, Yard and Garden Care Professionals, and 
Suppliers Opposed to the City Pesticide Ordinance" launched a media 
campaign, directed by a public relations firm, to defeat the ordi-
nance.242 They spent over $40,000, largely on radio and television 
commercials, and suggested that passage of the ordinance would 
make one's neighbors into criminals.243 The ordinance was de-
feated.244 
In an attempt to defeat the proposed FIFRA preemption amend-
ments and halt state and local preemption activities such as that in 
Missoula, the National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides 
(NCAMP), a Washington, D.C. based environmental group, has 
joined forces with other environmentalists, states' rights advocates, 
and the Wisconsin Public Intervenor. 245 In December 1991, Thomas 
J. Dawson, the Wisconsin Public Intervenor who argued Mortier, 
sent a letter to President Bush urging him to uphold the right of 
local governments to continue regulating pesticide use.246 The N a-
tional Association of SARA TITLE III Program Officials, an orga-
nization representing more than forty states, wrote in support of 
the right of local governments to regulate pesticides to EPA offi-
239 Kent Curtis, Chemical Waifare: National Chemical Lobbying Group Funds Pro-Pesti-
cide Campaign, MISSOULA INDEPENDENT, Oct. 31, 1991, at 11. 
240 Id. 
241 Letter from Ellen Leahy, Director, Missoula City County Health Department, to Rep. 
Pat Williams, U.S. Congo (Mar. 2, 1992) (on file with author). 
242 Curtis, supra note 239, at 11. No single Missoula homeowner has contributed money or 
significant time to this campaign. A single fifty dollar contribution represented the only local 
contribution. The rest came from out of town and state lawn care businesses and chemical 
industries. Interestingly, the campaign finance report disclosing the source of these contri-
butions was not filed until after the election. Id. 
243 Don Wiener, The Pre-Emptive Strike on Envt'l Law, IN THESE TIMES, Jan. 15-21,1992. 
244 Kent Curtis, Chemical Companies Withheld Report of $25,000 Until after Election, 
MISSOULA INDEPENDENT, Nov. 14, 1991, at 4. 
245 See FIFRA Pre-emptive Battle, supra note 13, at 764. 
246 Letter from Thomas J. Dawson, Wisconsin Public Intervenor, to The President, Wash. 
D.C. (Dec. 16, 1991) (on file with author). 
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cials.247 Similarly, various groups and officials have been lobbying 
members of Congress to oppose preemption legislation.248 NCAMP 
does its best to monitor statewide and local pesticide regulatory 
activity, but its resources are not as great as those of its opposing 
group, CSPP.249 NCAMP and its allies wish to make certain that the 
Mortier decision is not made moot. 
VI. LOCAL CONTROL OF PESTICIDES: OPPOSING POLICIES AND 
MOVEMENT TOWARD A COMPROMISE 
In Mortier, the plaintiffs relied on two main legal arguments: that 
under strict preemption principles the court was required to find 
"clear and manifest intent" to preempt on the part of Congress; and 
that under the system of federalism, states have the right to regulate 
matters concerning their health and safety.250 Now that the action 
has moved from the courts to the political arena, public policy stances 
define the debate over local control of pesticide use.251 
A. Arguments For and Against Local Control of Pesticide 
Regulations 
Policy arguments in favor of local control of pesticide regulations 
are generally divided between environmental imperatives and prin-
ciples of state sovereignty. Environmentalists maintain that locali-
ties have individual conditions such as climate, wind, population, and 
geographic differences and varying needs to protect their ground-
water supplies. No federal policy can encompass all of these con-
247 Letter from Gordon Henderson, President, Delaware Division of Energy, to Ms. Linda 
Fisher, Assistant Administrator, Pesticide and Toxic Substances, EPA (Jan. 30, 1992) (on file 
with author). 
248 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jim Kaup, supra note 237; Letter from Kristine M. Gebbie, 
Secretary of Health, State of Washington, to Rep. Margaret Rayburn, Chair, Washington 
House Agr. & Rural Dev. Comm. (Feb. 26, 1992) (on file with author); Letter from Philip N. 
Bredesen, Mayor, Nashville, Tenn., to Rep. Charles Rose, Ch. Subcomm. on Dept. Opera-
tions, Research and Foreign Agriculture (Mar. 2, 1992) (on file with author); Letter from 
James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, to Rep. Charles Rose, Washington, D.C. 
(Mar. 3, 1992) (on file with author). 
249 Telephone interview with Christina Roessler, Development Director, NCAMP (Feb. 14, 
1992). 
250 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Rule Localities May Impose Pesticide Rules Stiffer than 
U.S. Laws, N. Y. TIMES, June 22, 1991, at 9. 
251 See 137 CONGo REc., supra note 224, at E3987; 137 CONGo REc., supra note 223, at 
E3983; 137 CONGo REc., supra note 231, at SI8401. 
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cerns.252 Furthennore, the EPA has not been able adequately to 
control the use of pesticides. It could use the assistance of local 
governments because it is lagging in its goals to regulate pesti-
cides.253 Additionally, there are major areas of pesticide regulation, 
such as notice requirements, that FIFRA does not address. Local 
governments could regulate these areas best since they are indivi-
dualized and require little technical or scientific expertise. 254 
Environmentalists also point out that Congress originally envi-
sioned FIFRA as part of its overall environmental scheme. The 
environmental statutes which are part of this scheme work most 
effectively with cooperation between the federal, state, and local 
governments.255 
States' rights advocates present other arguments. Under the Con-
stitution, states have the right to detennine for themselves what 
role local governments are to play in areas of health, safety, and 
welfare. Regulating pesticides, they argue, is such a matter. 256 
Probably the strongest argument against preemption that sup-
porters of the Mortier decision offer is that both preceding and 
following Mortier, there has been no "floodgate" of pesticide regu-
lations. Instead, local regulations have been relatively few and nar-
row and have come in response to compelling problems.257 Even 
representatives of the pesticide industry estimate that there are 
only one hundred local jurisdictions in the United States with pes-
ticide controls on the books or under consideration. 258 
Policy arguments against local control have centered on two major 
areas: the regulatory chaos that might ensue if tens of thousands of 
localities did in fact enact their own pesticide ordinances,259 and the 
lack of scientific expertise available to local governments. 260 
The most prevalent argument against local pesticide regulation 
emphasizes that there are 83,000 local governments in this country. 
If each could pass pesticide regulations, the multitude of conflicting 
252 See FIFRA Amendments, Hearings on H.R. 3850, S. 2985 and H.R. 3742 Before the 
U.S. House of Representatives Agriculture Subcommittee on Department Operations, Re-
search, and Foreign Agriculture, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992) (statement of Thomas J. 
Dawson, Wisconsin Public Intervenor). 
253 See Goldman, supra note 84, at 2. 
254 See FIFRA Amendments, Hearings, supra note 252. 
255 See Brief of Conservation Law Foundation, supra note 56, at 10-35. 
256 See Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Hawaii, Alabama, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, 
Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Utah and Vermont, Wisconsin Public Intervenor 
v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct 2476 (1991) (No. 89-1905). 
257 See Letter of Thomas J. Dawson to Pres. Bush, supra note 246, at 5. 
258 Porter, supra note 221, at 687. 
259 See CONGo REC., supra note 25l. 
260 [d. 
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regulations would frustrate the purpose of FIFRA as a comprehen-
sive act. 261 This view also maintains that a federal and state plan 
would be sufficiently comprehensive to regulate pesticides. 262 
Additionally, opponents of local regulation point out that pesticide 
regulation requires technical and scientific expertise that is not avail-
able at the local level. They thus suggest that local input would be 
harmful to the goal of pesticide control. 263 Opponents of local pesti-
cide regulation insist that agriculture would be in jeopardy if local 
governments enacted their own pesticide regulations. They maintain 
that the cost to farmers of studying and complying with the myriad 
of local and often conflicting regulations would be so costly that it 
would put some farmers out of business. 264 
The debate over these arguments is continuing. Most recently, 
the EPA seems to have changed its position since arguing in Mortier 
in favor of local control. 265 During testimony before a congressional 
subcommittee considering the preemption legislation, an EPA ad-
ministrator proposed a new administration position maintaining that 
FIFRA should prohibit local governments from regulating pesticide 
sale and use unless a state has acted affirmatively to allow local 
regulation. 266 
B. Movement Toward a Compromise 
In Wisconsin, a group of environmental, turf industry, and local 
and state government representatives has recently attempted to 
reach a compromise solution to the continuing debate over local 
pesticide regulation.267 The group has drafted proposed pesticide 
regulations at the state level that are more stringent than previous 
regulations and to whose development local governments have con-
tributed. 268 These regulations would preempt any county or munic-
ipality from enacting any law related to landscape applications by 
commercial applicators which conflicts with or is more stringent than 
261Id. 
262Id. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. 
265 See FIFRA Amendments, Hearings before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Department 
Operations, Research and Foreign Agriculture (1992) (statement of Victor J. Kimm, Deputy 
Ass't. Administrator for Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances, EPA). 
266 Id. 
267 See FIFRA Pre-emption Battle, supra note 13, at 764. 
268 See Draft, Proposed Order of the State of Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade 
and Consumer Protection Adopting Rules, February 13, 1992. 
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the proposed rules. 269 No other state has reported similar compro-
mise efforts. Instead, the battle seems to be heating up. 
VII. A WORKABLE SOLUTION FOR LOCAL CONTROL OF 
PESTICIDES 
One would have thought that a unanimous Supreme Court decision 
in Mortier in June 1991 would have settled once and for all the issue 
of federal preemption of local pesticide ordinances. While Mortier 
decided the legal issue of preemption under FIFRA, it left still 
subject to debate the policy behind local control of pesticide use. 
This Comment has presented both sides of the issue of local control 
of pesticides. It concludes that localities should have the right to 
participate in the three-level scheme of pesticide control envisioned 
under FIFRA for reasons of both environmental policy and state 
sovereignty. 
Federal and state regulations have not adequately protected local 
areas from the dangers of pesticides. 270 While the federal govern-
ment's goals of registration and regulation under FIFRA are laud-
able, the United States General Accounting Office has acknowledged 
that the EPA simply does not have the resources to accomplish the 
task that Congress has assigned to it. 271 The scientific community 
knows well the dangers of pesticides. 272 Federal preemption would 
leave the public insufficiently protected. 
Most of the arguments against local control of pesticide use pre-
sented by the agri-chemical industry are premature, without proof, 
and based on scenarios that are unlikely to occur. There is no reason 
to believe, for instance, that all 83,000 localities in the United States 
are going to enact pesticide ordinances in reaction to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Mortier. In fact, only eighty local units of gov-
ernment have passed their own ordinances to regulate pesticides 
since Congress passed the 1972 FIFRA amendments. 273 
Furthermore, most of these local ordinances are not even regu-
latory in nature. 274 Most ordinances merely require the posting of 
269 [d. at 5. 
270 See Brief of Amici Curiae Village of Milford, supra note 67, at 10. 
271 [d. at 7. 
272 Tybe A. Brett & Jane E.R. Potter, Risk.s to Human Health Associated with Exposure 
to Pesticides at the Time of Application and the Role of the Courts. 1 VILL. ENVT'L L. J. 355 
(1990). 
273 Mary Jodron, Tom Kenworthy & Michael Weisskoph, White House Shift on Pesticides, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1992, at A19. 
274 See FIFRA Hearings, supra note 252. 
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notices after pesticide application and do not prohibit or restrict the 
use of FIFRA-approved pesticides.275 Other ordinances apply only 
to property owned by municipal governments themselves. 276 Some 
local pesticide regulations impose limits on aerial pesticide spraying 
to accord with local wind conditions277 or prevent surface and ground-
water contamination. 278 The only reported permitting system for 
pesticide registration is the Town of Casey ordinance, which only 
applies in limited situations. 279 No ordinance in any locality has 
banned the sale of a pesticide. 280 
The local ordinances that had been the subject of litigation prior 
to M artier-which, because they were chosen for court battle, one 
would expect to be the most egregious in their effect on the pesticide 
industry-are quite rational and limited in their scope. 281 They arose 
not out of an abstract desire to rid the community of the evils of 
pesticides but as the result of a particular harm or contamination 
caused by unregulated pesticide use. 282 It is exactly situations like 
these that provide the reason for local involvement in environmental 
or, for that matter, any health, safety, or welfare matter. This is 
how the system is supposed to work. Once communities experience 
a specific need for pesticide regulation, it is their prerogative and 
their duty to draft and debate the proposed ordinance through their 
legislative processes. There does not seem to be any compelling 
reason to halt this process, which has been proceeding so well. 
The local legislative process also assures that there will be no real 
damage to agriculture through local pesticide control. While Rep-
resentative Hatcher and Senator Pryor spoke on the House and 
Senate floors of the economic burdens local pesticide regulation 
would bring to farmers, common sense points to the contrary. Most 
rural town boards are comprised of farmers. 283 These board members 
are very knowledgeable about pesticides and their dangers and 
would not pass ordinances that would damage their own livelihood. 284 
275 GOLDMAN, supra note 84, at 10. 
276Id. at 8. 
277Id. at 7. 
278Id. 
279 Casey, Wis. Ordinance No. 85-1, § 1.2 (Sept. 10, 1985). 
280 GOLDMAN, supra note 84, at 6. 
281 See FIFRA Hearings, supra note 252. 
282Id. 
283 Id. 
284 See FIFRA Amendments, Hearings on H.R. 3850 and H.R. 3742 before the U.S. House 
of Represeritatives Agricultural Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and 
Foreign Agriculture, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992) (statement of Paul Swart). 
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The industry's argument that pesticide use regulation necessitates 
scientific expertise not available to local governments also seems 
without much merit. The types of local ordinances that cities and 
towns have adopted require mostly common sense. 285 Most impose 
the posting of warning signs or reflect concerns about local water 
supplies or wind and population conditions.286 Who is more familiar 
with these areas than local citizens? 
Local regulation of pesticide use should continue not only because 
it is sound environmental policy but also because it comports with 
notions of state sovereignty. In Mortier, the Supreme Court held 
that states are free to decide for themselves what regulatory role 
their local governments will play in the area of pesticide use.287 
States thus may expressly authorize, restrict, or prohibit local gov-
ernments' exercise of pesticide regulatory functions. 
From the beginning, the plaintiffs framed the Mortier case largely 
as involving a states' rights issue rather than simply an environ-
mental one.288 Framing the issue in this manner was a deliberate 
strategic decision based on the Wisconsin Public Intervenor's desire 
to present his case to the current members of the Supreme Court in 
the most favorable light.289 As a result, the Mortier decision was dry 
and devoid of any mention of environmental policy. The Court de-
cided the case as the plaintiffs predicted it would, writing an opinion 
based on strict preemption principles. These principles were rooted 
in the fundamental power of the states. Although the Court never 
specifically decided the Tenth Amendment question posed by the 
petitioners, the Court's opinion made it clear where it stood. 
In Mortier, one of the Court's more important decisions on 
preemption, the Court refused to accept implied congressional intent 
285 See FIFRA Amendments, Hearings, supra note 252. 
m Goldman, supra note 84, at 5-10. 
287 111 S. Ct. at 2483. 
288 The two questions presented for review by the Supreme Court were: "1. Under the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, is the authority of local units of govern-
ment to enact ordinances in the exercise of their policy powers to protect their citizens and 
environments from hazards of chemical pesticides preempted by the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) ... and 2. Where the Congress in FIFRA expressly 
allows states to regulate pesticides, may FIFRA, consistent with fundamental principles of 
federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, be inter-
preted to deprive states of their authority to delegate to local governments the task of 
regulating pesticides for protecting the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens?". Brief of 
Petitioners, supra note In, at i. 
289 Telephone interview with Thomas J. Dawson, Wisconsin Public Intervenor (Nov. 15, 
1991). Eleven states supported the plaintiffs' position by filing an amicus brief with the Court. 
See Brief of the States of Hawaii, Alabama, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, 
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as an indication of preemption. While the majority of the Court did 
not go so far as to reject the use of legislative history in ascertaining 
Congress's intent, the Court did state that the "clear and manifest 
intent" to preempt must be present.290 According to the Court, 
because Congress has the power explicitly to write into statutes the 
preemption of state or local authority, it should do so when it wants 
preemption. Courts should not have to rely on legislative reports 
and congressional records, which staff members and legislators often 
include to influence the courts in a particular manner, to discern 
what Congress meant. Thus, while the majority did not share Justice 
Scalia's concurrence suggesting the rejection of legislative history 
as a means of ascertaining congressional intent, the effect of the 
decision was probably to do just what Scalia suggested.291 In the 
future, Congress must draft statutes-particularly those in the area 
of rights of the states and localities versus the federal government-
that state expressly what they mean. 
Advocates of local control of pesticide use are again raising the 
issue of state sovereignty to the Bush Administration and to mem-
bers of Congress to get them to oppose the proposed preemption 
amendments to FIFRA. In a letter to President Bush, Wisconsin 
Public Intervenor Thomas J. Dawson wrote that no matter what its 
position on local regulation of pesticides, the Administration must 
promote the sovereign rights of states to protect the health and 
safety of their citizens.292 Politics indeed makes strange bedfellows, 
and on the issue of local regulation of pesticides, environmental and 
states' rights advocates have joined forces. It is this coalition that 
probably will stop the FIFRA amendments from passing in Con-
gress, although the vote appears to be a close one. 293 
Now is the perfect time for representatives from both sides of the 
issue of local control of pesticides to come to the bargaining table. 
While in the past the pesticide industry relied on its vast resources 
to fight local control through litigation, that option no longer exists. 
Industry now is relying on lobbying efforts, both at the national level 
and throughout all the states, to get preemption language into FI-
FRA and state statutes and halt any new local ordinances. Each 
time a locality passes an ordinance, it makes the battle that much 
more difficult for the pesticide industry. Even though they currently 
290 See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991). 
291 See id. at 2492. 
292 Letter of Thomas J. Dawson to President Bush, supra note 246. 
293 Telephone interview with Christina Roessler, Development Director, NCAMP (Feb. 14, 
1991). 
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have the law on their side, advocates of local control realize that the 
battle is continuing, and that their resources are limited. Power 
seems to be equally divided between the sides. This, then, is the 
time for some creative negotiation. 
The state of Wisconsin again has taken the lead by forming a 
committee of environmental, government, and turf industry repre-
sentatives under the leadership of the state Department of Agricul-
ture. 294 The committee has drafted regulations that establish notice 
and information requirements for the residential and landscape ap-
plications of pesticides. 295 These regulations are more stringent than 
the current state statute and, if the Wisconsin legislature enacts 
them after public hearings, they would prohibit counties and munic-
ipalities from passing ordinances that vary from any of the new 
provisions. 296 
The Wisconsin proposed turf regulations do not cover every area 
of pesticide use, only those upon which the committee was able to 
agree. 297 The proposed regulations do demonstrate, however, that 
the main argument of the pesticide industry-that local control will 
produce a patchwork of ordinances that will frustrate FIFRA and 
economically burden the industry-can be addressed and overcome. 
The industry has repeatedly stated that it wants uniform state rules. 
If this is true, then it should be satisfied with the type of regulations 
that the state of Wisconsin has proposed. If industry refuses to 
negotiate, then it will reveal that it has been disingenuous-that 
what it really wants is not uniform regulation but no regulation at 
all. 
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier emphasized that FIFRA 
is a tripartite scheme involving a partnership of federal, state, and 
local governments. In the state of Wisconsin, environmental advo-
cates and local government representatives have shown a willingness 
to work with the pesticide industry and state agencies to develop 
model ordinances and uniform state regulations acceptable to both 
sides. These regulations would protect citizens and the environment; 
coordinate local, state, and federal regulation; and at the same time 
provide the uniformity that industry says it wants. 
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Preemption of local control of pesticides is not necessary and would 
be harmful. Cooperation between representatives of the pesticide 
industry and environmental and state associations is what is needed. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court did not settle the issue of local pesticide 
regulation by deciding Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier. Al-
though the Court held that FIFRA does not preempt local govern-
ments from enacting pesticide bylaws and ordinances, it based its 
holding on both a reading of the plain language of the statute and 
an analysis of its legislative history through preemption principles 
requiring clear and manifest intent. 
The Court's holding suggests that if a legislature wants to preempt 
local control, it should explicitly say so in a statute. Following the 
Court's advice, pesticide manufacturers and users are trying to 
amend FIFRA to include express preemption language and, in case 
that tactic fails, are trying to write such language into the pesticide 
acts of every state. Supporters of preemption argue tnat local reg-
ulation will lead to regulatory confusion based on nonscientific prin-
ciples that will frustrate the original purpose of FIFRA. Supporters 
of local control of pesticide regulation maintain that FIFRA requires 
local input because the EPA is regulating in an insufficient manner, 
and because the statute provides for no other means to consider local 
conditions. Furthermore, they believe that under the Tenth Amend-
ment, it is the right of the states to determine the role that local 
governments will play. 
N ow is the time for both sides to work out a compromise solution 
because both sides of the issue are fairly equally balanced in terms 
of political power. Each state that has not already preempted local 
control of pesticides should follow the lead of Wisconsin. That state 
has formed a committee of representatives of environmental, gov-
ernment, and pesticide manufacturers and users groups to draft 
uniform statewide regulations: regulations more stringent than cur-
rent state statutes that would preempt localities from enacting by-
laws or ordinances varying from them. Such statutes would provide 
the needed local input into pesticide regulation while avoiding the 
industry's feared conflicting regulatory hodge-podge. 
